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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), which provides as follows: 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the 
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The supreme court had original jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review with respect to issues 1,2,3 and 7 in 
this case is as follows: 
After the marshalling all of the evidence 
which supports the decision of the court on 
the respective issues heretofore set forth, is 
there any competent evidence upon which to 
base the decisions of the trial court? If so, 
the appellate court must affirm the decision 
of the lower court; and if not, the appellate 
court must reverse the trial court's decision 
and direct it to enter judgement in favor of 
the defendant. 
A trial courts findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
Despite the evidence, were the trial 
court's findings so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous. 
The standard of review with respect to issues 4, 5 and 6 in 
this case is as follows: 
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The appellate court accords no particular 
deference to conclusions of law but rather 
reviews them for correctness. Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 
(Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068. 1070 (Utah 1985); Utah R.Civ.P.52(c). 
B. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Malice. Was the Court's ruling erroneous and 
against the clear weight of the evidence since there was no 
competent evidence of malice upon which to base a judgment against 
the defendant for attorneys fees? 
Standard of Review: 
A trial courts findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1147. 
Findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the clear 
weight of evidence or if the appellate court reaches (a) definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Edwards & 
Daniels Architects, Inc. v. Farmers' Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah App. 1993). 
Despite the evidence, were the trial court's findings so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence, 
thus making them clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
ISSUE 2. Survey. Was the Court's ruling erroneous and 
against the weight of the evidence since there was no competent 
evidence to show that Plaintiff's survey was correct in that it was 
not done in accordance with standard survey procedure and 
2 
Defendant's survey was done in accordance with standard survey 
rules and this survey evidence showed that Defendant was the owner 
of the property at issue? 
Standard of Review: 
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for 
Issue 1. 
ISSUE 3. Acquiescence. Was the Court's ruling erroneous and 
against the weight of the evidence since the Defendant proved the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence and there was no competent 
evidence introduced to refute this proof? 
Standard of Review: 
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for 
Issue 1. 
ISSUE 4. Evidence Of Value. Did the Court err in refusing to 
admit evidence of value of the disputed property? 
Standard of Review: 
The appellate court accords no particular deference to 
conclusions of law but rather reviews them for correctness. Berube 
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985); Utah R.Civ.P.52(c). 
ISSUE 5. Offset. Did the Court err in refusing to admit 
evidence of amounts paid in settlement by the Title Company? Is 
Defendant entitled to an offset for these amounts? 
Standard of Review: 
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for 
Issue 4. 
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ISSUE 6. Adverse Possession. Did the Court err in refusing 
to admit Defendant's evidence of adverse possession? 
Standard of Review: 
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for 
Issue 4. 
ISSUE 7. Slander Of Title On The Counterclaim. Did the 
Defendant prove the elements of slander of title on its 
counterclaim and was there competent evidence introduced to refute 
this proof? 
Standard of Review: 
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for 
Issue 1. 
III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 provides as follows: 
Adverse possession - Presumption - Provisio 
- Tax title. 
In every action for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title 
to or determine the owner thereof the person 
establishing a legal title to such property 
shall be presumed to have been possessed 
thereof within the time required by law; and 
the occupation of such property by any other 
person shall be deemed to have been under and 
in subordination to the legal title, unless it 
appears that such property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title for 
seven years before the commencement of such 
action. Provided, however, that if in any 
action any party shall establish prima facie 
evidence that he is the owner of any real 
property under a tax title held by him and his 
predecessors for four years prior to the 
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commencement of such action and one year after 
the effective date of this amendment he shall 
be presumed to be the owner of such property 
by adverse possession unless it appears that 
the owner of the legal title or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in 
possession of such property under such title 
or that such tax title owner and his 
predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes 
levied or assessed upon such property within 
such four-year period. 
The Professional Rules of Survey Standards, Rule defining 
ranking of calls provides as follows: 
Ranking of calls is based upon the rules 
of evidence and is commonly broadened to 
assist in interpretation of all forms of 
descriptions and boundary recover. The most 
common hierarchy of calls is as follows: 
1. Natural monuments; 
2. artificial monuments; 
3. distances; 
4. directions; and 
5. area. 
Any element of a description of a parcel 
may be rejected or overruled, based upon a 
review of the best evidence available. The 
courts have usually held that the most 
important and overriding factor in the 
interpretation of property descriptions is the 
intent of the parties. All of the words of a 
deed are to be considered so that evidence 
that best demonstrates the intention of the 
buyer and seller will prevail, in most cases. 
With this in mind, the writer of a metes and 
bounds description should ensure that the 
intention of the parties is clearly expressed. 
. . .A poor measurement to the correct 
corner is much superior to a precise 
measurement to a false corner. In real 
property boundaries, it is the physical 
location of the corners that is important. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case involves a boundary line dispute between two 
neighbors regarding the ownership of 11,777 square feet of property 
adjoining Old Ranch Road, which runs north and south near 
Snyderville, Utah. The Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors own property 
on the east side of the road, and the Defendant Appellant Cummings 
owns property on the west side of the road. The Plaintiffs 
Appellees Gillmors claim that they own a small strip of land on the 
west side of the road. Both the Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' and 
Defendant Appellant Cummings' surveys go to Ranch Road, but the 
Plaintiff/Appellees Gillmors claim that a small portion of Old 
Ranch Road was moved to the east, leaving part of their land on the 
west side of the road adjacent to Cummings' property. Cummings 
denied the road moved, but claims even if it did, he has since 
acquired title to the property by boundary line by acquiescence and 
adverse possession. 
Defendant Appellant Cummings subdivided his property including 
the disputed strip and sold lots upon which homes were built. The 
remaining Defendants Garlick, Pelton, Haren and Wohlford owned lots 
which the Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors claim include their 
disputed strip within these boundaries. Homes were build upon 
these lots and the homeowners title insurance policies were issued 
to these lot owners. The Title Company settled with Plaintiffs 
Appellees Gillmors prior to trial by paying them $45,000 for title 
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to the disputed strip and to settle all claims against these 
homeowners asserted by Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors. The only 
issue left for trial after the settlement was claimed by Plaintiffs 
Appellees Gillmors against Defendant Appellant Cummings for 
attorneys fees expended in the prosecution of this litigation. 
Defendant Appellant Cummings counterclaimed for slander of 
title on adjoining property. The disputed strip is illustrated by 
the following diagram: 
(sec eM-n^ *2. 
o 
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B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER 
COURT. 
Trial was held on August 10, 1993 in the Third District Court 
of Summit County, Coalville, Utah. After the Plaintiffs Appellees 
Gillmors had rested and in light of the fact that in the view of 
Defendant/Appellant Cummings the Plaintiff had not proven damages 
as to attorneys fees, the Defendant/Appellant elected to rest. A 
Judgement and Decree of Quiet Title was entered on November 23, 
1993 with a provision that allowed the Plaintiffs to reopen their 
case to prove their damages as to attorneys fees. 
Defendant Appellant Cummings moved the court for a new trial 
or in the alternative to reopen the trial to allow him to refute 
the attorneys fees and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' general 
allegations. Judge Wilkinson denied the motion for a new trial but 
allowed the trial to be reopened to allow the Plaintiffs to 
establish attorneys fees and also to allow Defendant Appellant 
Cummings to present his case in defense. 
Further trial proceedings were held on February 16 and 17, 
1994 with the closing arguments on February 24, 1994. The Amended 
Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was entered by the clerk of the 
Summit County Court on May 10, 1994 awarding Plaintiffs Appellees 
Gillmors damages for attorneys fees in the amount of $52,563.54. 
It is from this judgment that Defendant Appellant Cummings is now 
appealing. 
8 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
1. The deeds introduced into evidence at the trial are set 
forth in the following title drain as follows: 
Charles R. Spencer 
Was the common owner of the entire parcel 
which was broken up into two parcels. 
The dispute arises out of the division 
line of the two properties. 
Warranty Deed dated 10/25/26 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #r 
Warranty Deed dated 10/30/30 
Defendant's Exhibit #23 
Stephen T. Gillmor 
Died April 21, 1933 
Defendant's Exhibit #1 
Decree of Distribution 
dated October 19, 1934 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 
Decree of Distribution 
Emil Marcellin and 
Bernice Marcellin 
Warranty Deed 
Dated September 7, 1961 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #19 
De fendant/Appe11ant 
Veigh Cummings 
Alva J. Gillmor Stephen T. Gillmor, Jr. Margaret May Gillmor 
Contract of Sale 
Deed of Bargain and Sale 
Dated March 6, 1936 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 
1/2 Charles F. Gillmor, Sr 1/2 Edward L. Gillmor 
("The Older") 
V 
Warranty Deed 
Dated May 15, 1953 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #: 
Decree of Distribution 
*\j/ Dated 09/03/71 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 
1/4 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr, 
Warranty 
Dated Fe: 
Plaintif 
1/4 
Edward L. Gillmor 
("Bud") 
1/2 
Florence Gillmor 
Deed 
fyruary 26, 1988 
s Exhibit #1 
Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Charles F. Gillmor. Jr, and Nadine Gillmor 
Title by partition degrees 
1/4 Dated February 14, 1981 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 
3/4 
2. The deeds in the title drain emanate from common grantors, 
Charles R. Spencer and Isabelle Spencer, The first two deeds were 
given to Stephen T. Gillmor on October 25, 1926 and the second deed 
was given to Emil Marcellin in 1931. The description contained in 
the deed to Marcellin was all the rest of the property owned by 
Charles R. Spencer less that portion already deeded to Stephen T. 
Gillmor. The two separate parcels at that point had a common 
boundary legal description and the only factual issue is where that 
legal description fell on the ground. 
3. A dispute of facts was erroneously injected into the case 
by virtue of a partition decree entered into, to settle litigation 
between Edward L. Gillmor and Siv Gillmor, his wife V. Florence 
Gillmor, Charles F. Gillmor (one of the plaintiffs in this action) 
and Melba Gillmor his wife, Civil No. 223998 Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). Charles 
F. Gillmor is now married to Nadine Gillmor, the other plaintiff 
herein. A new legal description was generated for the purpose of 
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that decree that differed from the descriptions used by Charles R. 
Spencer when he divided the property originally (R001372 and 
Exhibit #1). The boundary line between the disputed properties was 
described differently in the partition decree than it was in the 
Charles R. Spencer deeds dated: 
(a) October 25, 1926, and 
(b) October 30, 1930. 
The deeds from Charles R. Spencer to Stephen T. Gillmor and 
Bernice Marcellin used the following boundary line description to 
define the boundary line between the two parcels of property: 
...thence West approximately 5 rods to a point on 
the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod wide road and at 
a point 3 rods Easterly from the center line of said road 
and at right angles thereto; thence along the Easterly 
side of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the center 
line thereof and at right angles thereto, Northerly and 
Westerly to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest corner 
to the Northwest Quarter of Section 28, aforesaid; thence 
West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on a direct line 61 
rods, more or less, to the point of beginning. (Emphasis 
added) (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). 
The description generated for the partition decree is set 
forth as follows as it pertains to the dividing line between the 
two properties. 
. . .thence southeasterly 1006.50 feet more or less to 
the west quarter corner of said section 28, thence east 
49.50 feet, thence southeasterly along a road to a point 
that is 82.50 feet west of the point of beginning thence 
east 82.50 feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis 
added) 
4. The deeds from Spencer to Gillmor and from Spencer to 
Marcellin have one point of beginning and the partition decree has 
a different point of beginning. The Spencer deeds describe the 
property by using a clockwise boundary description and the 
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partition decree described the property using a counterclockwise 
boundary description. 
5. The reason so many of the facts relied upon herein are 
cited to Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 is because it was a many paged 
exhibit containing all of the title documents in Plaintiff's chain 
of title. 
6. Emil Marcellin told Defendant Appellant Cummings that 
Veigh Cummings and his co-owner owned the property west of the 
county road. This included the disputed strip of property (R1497 
and Pelton testimony). 
7. The partition decree description did not close by at least 
200 feet (R 1764, 1765, 1412). 
8. The survey of the partition decree description used a 
distance call in preference to a call to a monument. The survey of 
Kent Wilde who testified at the trial that the Spencer deed 
description went to the road relied on the call to the monument 
rather than the distance call. 
9. Defendant Appellant Cummings occupied the property since 
1961 and at no time during his occupancy did anyone dispute his 
ownership (R 001587). 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE ONE 
MALICE 
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF 
MALICE UPON WHICH TO BASE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The clear and convincing evidence at trial showed Defendant 
Appellant Cummings bore no malice and demonstrated none in his 
actions with respect to the property. He relied on his deeds in 
the chain of title, all of which tied his east line description to 
"Old Ranch Road". Defendant Appellant Cummings and his co-owner, 
Al Pelton, from whom Defendant/Appellant Cummings later purchased 
the remaining 1/2 interest in the property, were both told by Emil 
Marcellin that they owned all of the property west of the "Road". 
No one had questioned or challenged Defendant Appellant Cummings' 
possession of all of the property west of the "Road" from 1961 when 
he purchased it until this action was commenced on October 15, 
1987. 
B. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE TWO 
SURVEY 
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF'S SURVEY WAS CORRECT IN THAT IT WAS NOT DONE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD SURVEY PROCEDURE AND DEFENDANT'S SURVEY 
WAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD SURVEY RULES AND THIS SURVEY 
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AT 
ISSUE. 
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Kent Wilde, a civil engineer and licensed surveyor, surveyed 
the boundary line description as it was set forth in both Defendant 
Appellant Cummings' and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' description 
acquisition deeds. He testified that his survey ran along the 
existing road and that, therefore, all of the property west of the 
road was within Defendant Appellant Cummings' legal description and 
outside of Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' legal description. James 
West, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' surveyor testified to the 
contrary, but his survey was fatally flawed for the following 
reasons: 
(1) He used the partition decree's boundary line which was 
outside of the chain of title. 
(2) There was a discrepancy between a call to a monument and 
the distance to that monument. He used the distance call by 
mistake because the Rules of Surveying require that in that 
situation, one must use the monument, which was the road, and had 
he done so, his survey would have been consistent with Kent 
Wilde's. 
(3) His survey did not close by more than 200 feet. 
For each and all of these reasons, his survey must be 
rejected. 
C. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE THREE 
ACQUIESCENCE 
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
INTRODUCED TO REFUTE THIS PROOF. 
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Laborious attempts to marshal1 the evidence contrary to 
boundary line by acquiescence have revealed that there is no such 
evidence and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors should be required to 
refute this from the record if they can. 
The evidence shows that Defendant Appellant Cumminqs fenced 
the property in dispute and occupied it without complaint or 
interference for 23 years which qives him title by acquiescence to 
the disputed strip. 
D. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE FOUR 
EVIDENCE OF VALUE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Dale Jackman's 
appraisal or his testimony of the value of the land in dispute. 
Attorneys fees should bear some reasonable relationship to the 
primary amount in dispute. Dale Jackman's proffered testimony was 
that the disputed strip had a value of $7,000.00. This testimony 
was relevant for two purposes: 
(1) To show that an award of attorneys fees in the amount of 
$52,000.00 was excessive in view of the small amount of value in 
the disputed property. 
(2) That figure should have been subtracted from the 
$45,000.00 which the Title Company paid as the reasonable portion 
to quiet title to the property and the balance of $38,000.00 should 
be credited to the attorneys fees judgment. 
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E. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE FIVE 
OFFSET 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF AMOUNTS PAID 
IN SETTLEMENT BY THE TITLE COMPANY. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN 
OFFSET FOR THESE AMOUNTS. 
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit evidence of 
amounts paid in settlement to Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors by the 
Title Company and ruled that said amounts could not be used as an 
offset for attorneys fees awarded at trial after credit was given 
for the fair market value of the property. By not crediting the 
settlement amounts, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors would receive 
double compensation and Defendant Appellant Cummings would be 
vulnerable to double damages in further litigation by the Title 
Company in Civil No. 940300009 to seek reimbursement for the 
settlement which they made. 
F. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE SIX 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE OF 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Defendant 
Appellant Cummings' evidence on adverse possession which would have 
demonstrated that from 1961 until 1987, Cummings and his successors 
paid all of the property taxes on the property and thus would have 
been entitled to receive judgment on the theory of Adverse 
Possession as provided in the statute. The Court by doing so ruled 
as a matter of law that the Defendant Appellant Cummings was not 
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entitled to assert a claim for adverse possession and this was a 
question of fact to be tried at the trial on its merits. 
G. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUE SEVEN 
SLANDER OF TITLE ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF SLANDER OF TITLE ON ITS 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO 
REFUTE THIS PROOF. 
The evidence and testimony at trial demonstrated that 
Defendant Appellant Cummings' title to his property was slandered 
when Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors recorded the survey map in 1987 
followed by the filing of a lis pendens which frustrated a proposed 
sale that was pending on the property. Cummings is entitled to 
judgment against Plaintiff/Appellees Gillmors for Slander of Title. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
MALICE 
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF 
MALICE UPON WHICH TO BASE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Utah law does not allow an award of attorneys fees in a quiet 
title action unless they can be based upon one of the following 
grounds: 
(1) Malice on the part of the defendant. 
(2) A showing of bad faith prosecution of the litigation 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
(3) A contractual provision allowing such an award. 
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The evidence does not show nor do the Plaintiffs Appellees 
Gillmors contend that there is either bad faith or a contractual 
provision upon which to claim attorneys fees. Therefore, in order 
to prevail on this issue, the Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors must 
show malice. 
Two legal issues should now be considered in connection with 
the malice question: 
(1) What standard must be met under Utah law to establish 
malice in a quiet title action? 
(2) How does this standard distinguish between those cases in 
which an award of attorneys fees is appropriate and those cases 
which are routine quiet title actions where an award of attorneys 
fees would be inappropriate? 
Attorneys fees have been held to be recoverable as special 
damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on 
the title if the elements of a slander of title action have been 
proven. See Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 89 Utah 
Advanced Reports 11, Utah 1988, Dowse v. Doris Trust, 116 Utah 111, 
208 P.2d 958, Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 549 
(10th Cir 1974). 
In order to qualify for a recovery of attorneys fees, the 
elements of a slander of title action must be proven. 
These elements are set forth as follows: 
First, there must be a publication, either oral or written, of 
a slanderous statement. A slanderous statement is one that is 
derogatory or injurious to the legal validity of an owner's title 
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or his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property; second, 
the statement must be false; third, the statement must have been 
made with malice; and, fourth, the statement must cause actual or 
special damages to the plaintiff. See Jack B. Parsons Companies v. 
Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (utah 1988); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co, 
116 Utah 106, 110-11, 208 P.2d 956, 958 (1949). See also McNichols 
v. Coneios-K Corp., 29 Colo.App. 205, 209, 482 P.2d 432, 434 
(1971); Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897). See 
generally 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §541 (1970). 
The court stated in Bass supra, at 12: 
There are no general or presumed damages in slander 
of title actions. Special damages are ordinarily proved 
in a slander of title action by evidence of a lost sale 
or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage. 
The court stated in Bass, that one of the reasons Bass could 
not recover an award for damages for slander of title was... 
Plaintiffs produced none of the prospective buyers 
at trial, and there was no evidence of any lost sales. 
See Bass supra at page 12. 
In the instant case, the Gillmors settled their case prior to 
trial with the parties to whom Veigh Cummings had sold the 
property. Any attorneys fees incurred after that date were not 
incurred in an effort to clear title and should not be awarded. In 
fact, no attorneys fees whatever should be awarded because no lost 
sale was proven which was a threshold requirement which had to be 
met before any attorneys fees at all could be awarded. 
It now becomes the duty of Defendant Appellant Cummings to 
marshall the evidence by listing all of the evidence supporting the 
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finding on malice which is now being challenged and to demonstrate 
that all of such evidence taken together was against the clear 
weight of the evidence and, therefore, the lower court's ruling was 
clearly erroneous. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 
(Utah 1993); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper 
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co. , 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 
971, 977 (Utah App. 1994); Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 n.2 
(Utah App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah App. 
1993); Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327; Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 
863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 
(Utah App. 1993); Gray, 851 P.2d at 1225; King v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Johnson v. Board of 
Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Peterson. 841 
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 
(Utah App. 1991). 
The Defendant Appellant herewith marshals the evidence in 
support of a finding of malice and submits the following: 
Mr. Kinghorn evaluated the elements of malice and read from 
the Parley Neeley deposition as follows: (R. 001540 - R. 001545) 
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The third element is malice. Under the cases, 
malice need not be shown as actual malice. It 
need only be shown by the doing of a willful 
or reckless act in disregard in the rights of 
others. That's where Mr. Neeley's testimony 
becomes interesting. 
It's also interesting that Mr. Cummings 
has testified, I think inconsistent with the 
testimony of Mr. Neeley, and what I would like 
to do is point out to the court the testimony 
of Mr. Neeley who is a man who prepared the 
legal descriptions which were used in the 
deeds that Mr. Cummings signed that slandered 
our title. 
Mr. Neeley prepared I believe exhibit no. 
21, the two drawings of the Treasure Mountain 
Estates, and in his testimony, this is what he 
says about what he was instructed to do to 
prepare his survey. In response to a 
Question— 
The Court: Where are you? 
Mr. Kinghorn: I'm going to start at page 
8 your honor, the statement of Parley Neeley, 
which is page 8, line 20. I said: 
Q. Mr. Neeley, did you go out to the area of 
the survey and physically conduct a survey of 
the property? 
A. I believe so, yes. I have been out there, 
and I believe I was there when a survey was 
done. 
Q. Did you go out there with your client to 
do the survey work? 
A. I didn't go out with Jackson Howard, I 
went out with someone else it was one of two. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. I don't know whether it was Elrod Starley 
or Veigh Cummings, but one of those two. I 
think it was Veigh Cummings. 
Q. Do you recall where you met Mr. Cummings 
when you started this survey work? 
A. If I remember right, I met him at the 
Newhouse Hotel and he came up to Snyderville 
where the survey was conducted. I went with 
him. 
Q. Tell me what happened when you went up 
there with Mr. Cummings. How were you 
instructed to perform the worked that you 
preformed and tell us what you did. 
I was asking Mr. Neeley, if you turn back 
to page 5 and page 6 and 7, I was asking him 
specifically about legal descriptions that are 
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on the drawing which is exhibit no. 21. In 
response to my guestion about how he was 
instructed to perform the survey and what he 
did, he said. 
The Court: Where are you now? 
Mr. Kinghorn: Page 90. Line 20. He said: 
There were fences surrounding the property on 
all sides. There was a road on the east side 
and a road on the south side, But there was 
fence along that county road. However, I was 
told to go the center of the middle of this 
road. 
Q. Who gave you those instructions? 
A. Whoever I went with. I think it was Mr. 
Cummings. 
Q. Did he show you corners and boundaries 
that he wanted you to survey? 
A. I don't know that we physically walked out 
to them, but standing in various places, they 
were pointed out. 
Q. Did he indicate to you that was the extent 
of the property he owned? 
A. Indicated that was the extent of the 
property we were to do our work on. 
Q. Were you ever furnished a copy of a deed 
and asked to survey the description on the 
deed in connection with this work, Mr. Neeley? 
A. I have looked through the folder here, and 
I see no evidence of descriptions or deeds. I 
think that's indicative of why we call this a 
"Post Survey." 
(Mr. Kinghorn) I asked him: 
Q. What do you mean by "Post Survey"? 
A. That's language used on the exhibit, "Post 
Survey." We use it in our office as the area 
that's being posted by the owner or the 
owners, outlined by the physical monuments, 
natural or artificial. In this case it would 
be artificial. 
There are wooden fences and roads. 
Mr. Kinghorn: What's clear from the testimony 
of Mr. Neeley, and he also goes on to tell 
about how he did perimeter descriptions and he 
calculated descriptions for lots, but what's 
important about Mr. Neeley's testimony, your 
honor, is that it's clear Mr. Cummings, first 
of all, he has a deed from Mr. Marcellin, and 
he has taken title to property under legal 
description in that deed, and in fact his 
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partner Mr. Pelton had used that identical 
legal description in conveying property back 
to him in 1965, which is the same year this 
survey was done. 
Mr. Cummings had access to that deed. 
Mr. Cummings had that deed, obviously, in his 
transaction with Mr. Pelton, but he didn't use 
that deed. Then he instructed Mr. Neeley to 
go out and perform the survey. Instead, he 
took him out there and had him survey 
something entirely different than the 
description on the deed. What happens to the 
property that's in dispute here, Mr. Cummings 
wasn't careful, and that's the kind of 
willfulness and recklessness that our court's 
recognize as implied malice. 
The second position I would point to as 
evidence of implied malice here is the 
inconsistent statements he made to Frank 
Marcellin the other day. This just came out 
in the course of my interview with Mr. 
Marcellin. I asked him if he ever talked to 
Mr. Cummings about this, and he said, "Well, 
the other day he said this to me about why he 
thought owned property. He just assumed he 
owned it." 
He never told Mr. Marcellin, "Frank, your 
dad told me I owned this property." He didn't 
come out and tell that to Mr. Marcellin. 
That's his testimony in court today. 
But that's now what he told Frank two or 
three days ago when they were eyeball to 
eyeball out on the property and talking about 
the exact area in dispute. That's evidence of 
an inconsistent statement by Mr. Cummings and 
is also further evidence of malice, that he 
has knowledge of what he did, he knows what he 
did under these circumstances. 
What Mr. Marcellin testified to as to the meeting with Mr. Cummings 
is as follows: (R. 001526 - R. 001530) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) During this past week, did 
you have occasion to meet with veigh Cummings 
on his property that's in dispute in this 
case? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Tell us why you were there, what you were 
doing. 
A. I took him and his attorneys out to the 
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place in question, showed them where the east-
west property line was, took Mr. Cummings' 
attorney down off the bottom of the hill and 
showed him where our property line ran north 
to south, and then came back up and was up 
there. And I told Veigh, I says, "I always 
though you bought this piece of property from 
the Gillmors." 
Q. What piece of property were you referring 
to? 
A. That piece of property that's—That's 
where Al Pelton and the Garlick home is, 
that's to the west of the now-present Old 
Ranch Road. 
Q. Let me refer you to the exhibit that we 
have marked and which you've testified from 
before. Let me refer you to sheet no. 2 of 
Exhibit No. 2, and I'll ask: Does this sheet 
depict the property you were asking Mr. 
Cummings about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did this conversation take place? 
A. I believe it was last Friday, and it was 
somewhere about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock in the 
morning. 
Q. Who was present besides you and — . 
A. Veigh Cummings, his attorney and the 
gentleman in back with the tie on, and the 
lady to the right with the glasses on. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Cummings some questions 
about this ownership? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Tell us what you said and what he said. 
A. I asked him, "I always though you bought 
this property from Gillmors," Because I told 
him where our property line was, and our dad 
always showed us where that property line 
went. 
Mr. Summerhays: objection to what his 
father told him. 
The Court: I'll sustain as to what his 
father told him; I'll overrule as to what he 
saw, what he saw his father do, where his 
father walked on the property line. 
Mr. Summerhays: Move to strike those 
portions of what— 
The Court: I would grant that. 
Mr. Kinghorn: Thank you. did you take 
Mr. Cummings down to the area that you have 
generally as this black line you initialled 
here on sheet 2 of exhibit 2? 
A. I did not. 
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Q. You did not take Mr. Cummings down there? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you go down there with any of the 
others? 
A. Mr. Suiranerhays 
Q. Where did this conversation with Mr. 
Cummings occur? Where was he when you had 
that conversation? 
A. We came back up to the road, and I—when I 
asked him if he hadn't bought it from Frank, 
he "I assume I owned it" I said, "What do you 
mean you assumed you owned t? Who told you 
owned it." And he never answered me, just 
left it. 
Q. Did he tell you at the time that your 
father had told him he owned it? 
A. He did not? 
Q. Did he make any statement to you or any 
indication to you that he had received 
information from your father that he owned 
this triangular piece of property that's in 
dispute? 
A. He did not. 
Q. What was the statement he made to you 
about his ownership of the property? 
Mr. Summerhays: Objection, repetitious, 
he's said it once. It's his witness. 
Mr. Kinghorn: I want to make it clear 
that he said it in report of the conversation. 
The Court: I'll allow the question. 
Q. What was the statement he made to you when 
you asked him who told him he owned the 
property? 
A. Well, he assumed. 
Q. He assumed that he owned it? 
A. Yes. 
The foregoing is against the clear weight of the evidence 
which is set forth as follows: 
Mr. Cummings testified : (R. 001519 - R. 001520) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) When you had Mr. Neeley 
prepare this survey of your property, did you 
know that you were defining the boundary 
between yourself, your property, and the 
Gillmor property? 
A. That I was defining it? 
Q. Yes, when you had Mr. Neeley survey this. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You took him out there and showed him 
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around the property, and showed him where you 
thought the boundaries were? 
A. Yes, and we verified it I think with the 
legal descriptions that were given to him. 
Q. We don't know today what Mr. Neeley did 
other than what's in his testimony, do we? 
A. I haven't recalled his testimony. 
Q. So anything you might say about him 
verifying things is just speculation on your 
part; is that correct? 
A. I know him or Jackson Howard. 
Q. When you had Mr. Neeley survey the 
property, did you make any attempt to contact 
any member of the Gillmor Family and say, 
"here is where I think the boundary is, do you 
folks agree to that?" 
A. No. Why would I do that? 
Q. You took no steps when you were going on 
to a different legal description, you took no 
steps to contact you neighbors and find out— 
A. No. 
Q. If the descriptions were consistent? 
A. No. I had had the property for years, and 
I knew where my boundaries were. 
(R. 001498 - R. 001500) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Prior to time you received 
exhibit no. 19 from Mr. Marcellin and his 
wife, do you recall whether or not you saw a 
legal description of the property you were 
going to buy? 
A. No, I don't think I did. 
Q. Was this deed the first legal description 
you saw for the Marcellin property you were 
purchasing? 
A. Probably. 
Q. After you received this deed, did you take 
it and go out in the field and try to locate 
any of the boundaries that are shown in this 
deed? 
A. No, not at the time. 
Q. Did you ever hand this deed to a surveyor 
and say, would you please go out in the field, 
Mr. Surveyor, and mark the boundaries of this 
deed, "Prior to the commencement of this case? 
A. I think we gave a tax notice and the deed 
to Pat Neeley, yes. 
Q. Do you think you did? 
A. Yes, I know we gave him some legal 
descriptions; whether it was a deed or a tax 
notice or which we did give him there were 
some descriptions of the property. 
Q. Are you prepared to testify today that you 
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gave this deed to Pat Neeley and asked him to 
go out and survey the boundaries of this 
property? 
A. No. 
Q. I'll show you what's been marked as 
Exhibit no. 20. Can you identify this 
document for us, Mr. Cummings? 
A. It was a Quit Claim deed when I bought Al 
Pelton's interest in the ranch out. 
Q. That was in April of 1965; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 1505 - R. 1507) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Drawing no. 5765, that's a 
drawing that was prepared for you by Parley 
Neeley? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes. 
Q. Of what is called Treasure Mountain? 
A. Ranches. 
Q. Treasure Mountain Ranches, is this the 
subdivision that you were telling us about a 
moment ago that you and attorneys from Provo 
were planning to develop together? 
A. Jackson Howard, yes 
Q. Were you present when Mr. Neeley conducted 
the survey from which this drawing comes? 
A. Oh, I was up there at times when they were 
working, but no, I wasn't there all the time; 
but yes, I was up there while they were 
working. 
Q. Did you show Mr. Neeley the boundaries of 
the property you claimed so he could prepare 
this survey? 
A. I"m sure I rode around the road and showed 
him what we had bought and everything. 
Q. You took him around and showed him where 
you wanted him to survey the line for the 
development that you and Mr. Howard and Mr. 
Lewis were going to develop? 
A. Yes, I showed him the ground we had 
bought, yes. 
Q. And do you remember meeting with him down 
at the Old Hotel Newhouse and going up the 
property to take him around the property 
boundary 
A. Possibly so, It seems like I could have 
met him up there, yes. 
Q. After this drawing was prepared, did you 
have a chance to examine it? Did you look at 
it? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Did you compare the legal description of 
27 
the boundaries of this survey with the legal 
description of the deeds you had received from 
Mr. and Mrs. Marcellin? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You never did that? 
A. No, I don't know that I'd be qualified to 
do that' but no, I didn't that I recall 
anyway. 
Q. The legal descriptions that appear on 
Exhibit nos. 7 and 8 call the legal 
descriptions that were performed by Mr. Neeley 
after he did— 
A. Yes. 
Q. — the survey that's reflected on this 
drawing no. 57 65? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that where these legal descriptions 
came from right off 
A. I think so; yes, I think that's right. 
Q. So after you had Mr. neeley prepare this 
new survey of the property, the survey that's 
shown on exhibit no. 21, You used those legal 
descriptions whenever you conveyed property 
out to buyers.? 
A. This legal description is in here, yes, 
those are attached to the plat. 
(R. 1508) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Are you the one that was 
responsible for taking Mr. Neeley up to the 
property and showing him the boundaries that 
you wanted surveyed for development? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) Jackson Howard, Rex Lewis 
and myself, and Pat Neeley, were there on more 
than one occasion together. 
Q. So is it your testimony that Jackson 
Howard and Mr. Lewis are responsible for the 
boundary description on this property? 
A. Well, I assumed so; they sure -
they knew where the property line was, and 
they sure—they did. 
Q. Had they ever been up there with Mr. 
Marcellin to look at the property before you 
purchased it from him? 
A. I don't Know. 
Q. They were interested in the property back 
when you purchased it from Mr. Marcellin, were 
they 
A. I don't know. I don't think so. I don't 
know. 
Q. You had no contact with them when Mr. 
Pelton purchased it? 
A. No. 
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Q. They would have no reason to visit with 
Mr. Marcellin about boundaries, would they? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. They wouldn't have any basis of any 
knowledge to take anybody out there and say, 
"Here's the boundaries of this farm"? 
A. Well, they—this legal description, and 
the fact is Jackson gave legal descriptions 
and that to Mr. Neeley. 
Q. How do you know he was there? 
A. Because I was there. I don't know whether 
it was tax notices or the legal descriptions 
off the
 vdeed, but it was legal descriptions, 
tax notices or deeds. 
Q. What did you see him give Mr. Neeley? Was 
there a piece of paper with writing on it? 
A. I think it was tax notices. 
Q. You think it was tax notices? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Did you read the piece of paper that Mr. 
Howard gave to Mr. Neeley? 
A. I think I gave the piece of paper to Mr. 
Jackson Howard that he gave to Mr. Neeley. 
Q. Did you read it? 
A. Yes, I'm sure that is was tax notices. I 
think it was tax notices on the ranch. 
Q. But it wasn't a deed? 
A. Not that I recall, I'm not sure. Maybe we 
gave them both. 
Q. You don't remember today which of the two? 
A. No, I think we may have given them both, 
but I'm quite sure we gave them tax notices. 
(R. 35) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) When you asked Mr. 
Neeley to survey this property, did you give 
him any instructions about how to do it? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) Well, we took him around 
the road and showed him where the boundaries 
were on the road, and naturally we gave him 
some tax notices or the legal descriptions we 
got from Marcellin. Some attorneys from Provo 
were involved with me in that development and 
they were the ones that contacted Mr. Neeley 
on the first instance, and the paperwork and 
the deal was made in Howard Jackson's office 
in Provo. 
Q. Jackson Howard? 
A. Jackson Howard, yes, sir. 
Q. And did he assist you in determining where 
those boundary lines were, in his opinion? 
A. Oh, yes. He and Rex Lewis were partners 
with me and they had much more knowledge in 
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the legal matters than I did. 
Q. And did you get a legal opinion from them 
that your title went to the road? 
A. Oh, yes. absolutely. 
Q. And did you, in good faith, rely on that? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Neely in effect said he did not know whether he had 
received a legal description or not, but didn't think so because 
there were none in his file at the time of the file. Defendant 
Appellant Cummings stated repeatedly that Mr. Neely was provided 
with tax notices as legal descriptions. Defendant Appellant 
Cummings' testimony clearly is dispositive by its decisive weight, 
but under either scenario, there was no malice in view of the fact 
that it was undisputed that Defendant Appellant Cummings relied on 
good faith by legal opinions of his counsel that his property lied 
up to the road. Defendant Appellant Cummings relied on Emil 
Marcellin showing and telling him he owned everything west of the 
road (R. 32, 001521, 001497) and also Emil Marcellin had told Al 
Pelton the same thing that the property was of the road was what he 
was selling (R. 18). No one disputed this testimony that Emil 
Marcellin didn't tell and show both Veigh Cummings and Al Pelton 
the property was all that west of the road was what they were 
purchasing. So when Frank Marcellin asked whether he had purchased 
the property from Gillmors and relying upon what Frank's father 
Emil had told both himself and Al Pelton the reply to Frank of "I 
assumed I owned it" is reasonable and certainly does not reflect 
any degree of malice, implied or otherwise. 
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B. 
SURVEY 
THE COURT'S RULING HAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE 
HEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE HAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SHOH THAT PLAINTIFF'S SURVEY HAS CORRECT IN THAT IT HAS NOT DONE IN 
ACCORDANCE HITH STANDARD SURVEY PROCEDURE AND DEFENDANT'S SURVEY 
HAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE HITH STANDARD SURVEY RULES AND THIS SURVEY 
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT HAS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AT 
ISSUE. 
Marshalling the evidence shows that the acquisition deed 
description both defines the boundary as corresponding with 
Cummings' existing road and requires that title be quieted in 
Defendant Appellant Cummings. James West, Plaintiffs Appellees 
Gillmors' surveyor testified to the contrary, but his survey was 
fatally flawed for the following reasons: 
(1) He used the partition decree's boundary line which was 
outside of the chain of title. 
(2) There was a discrepancy between a call to a monument and 
the distance to the monument. He used the distance call by mistake 
because the Rules of Surveying require that in that situation, one 
must use the monument, which was the road, and had he done so, his 
survey would have been consistent with Kent Wilde's 
(3) His survey did not close by more than 200 feet. 
For each and all of these reasons, his survey must be 
rejected. 
The Defendant Appellant herewith marshals the evidence in 
support of a finding that the survey by James West is the correct 
interpretation of the historical deeds and therefore it was correct 
to Quiet Title in the Plaintiffs. 
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The historical deeds emanate from a common grantor Charles R. 
and Isabell Spencer. The first deed was given to Stephen T. 
Gillmor on October 25, 1926 and the second to Emil Marcellin in 
1931. The description to Marcellin was all the rest of the Spencer 
property in that area less the portion deeded to Gillmor. The 
portion of the deed in dispute is as follows: 
. . .thence West approximately 5 rods to a point 
on the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod 
wide road and at a point 3 rods Easterly from 
the center line of said road and at right 
angles thereto; thence along the Easterly side 
of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the 
center line thereof and at right angles 
thereto, Northerly and Westerly to a point 3 
rods East from the Southwest corner to the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 28, 
aforesaid;thence West 3 rods; thence 
Northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods, more 
or less, to the point of beginning. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Partitian Decree, goes counterclockwise. The historical deeds 
go clockwise, the partitian decree states: 
...thence southeasterly 1006.50 feet more or 
less to the west quarter corner of said 
section 28, thence east 49.50 feet, thence 
southeasterly along a road to a point that is 
82.50 feet west of the point of beginning, 
thence east 82.50 feet to the point of 
beginning. (Emphasis added) 
James West testified: (R. 001372) 
Q. Okay, tell me the legal description that 
you use as a basis for what you surveyed? 
A. I used the Partition Decree which is on 
page 33 of— 
Q. You're referring to the partition decree 
in the Gillmore v. Gillmore? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who furnished that to you? 
A. Frank and Nadine Gillmore. 
Q. Did they ask you to do something when they 
gave you that legal description? 
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A. To identify their boundaries. 
Q. They asked you to identify boundaries 
shown in the partition decree on the ground? 
A. Yes 
Mr. West later testified that he compared the historical deeds 
and the partition decree and the description were the same in the 
disputed area as follows: (R. 1390) 
Q. We.., do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not the boundary line as described in this 
deed I just read to you are the same or not as 
the boundary lines you have depicted on your 
survey? 
A. It's the same. 
Mr. West's interpretation and reading of the historical deed 
at the point of dispute is as follows: (R. 001370 - R. 001371) 
A. Thence along the easterly side of said 
road and three rods easterly from the 
centerline thereof at right angles thereto 
northerly and westerly to a point three rods 
east from the southwest corner of the 
northwest quarter of section 28. 
Q. Can you find that point three rods west of 
the west quarter corner of section 28? 
A. From here to here. 
Q. Is that three rods, is it the 49.5 feet; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So it goes along the road to a point 49.5 
feet east of the west quarter corner of 
section 28; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where does it go from there? Thence west 
three rods? 
A. West three rods, that would be back to the 
quarter corner. 
Q. The west quarter corner of section 28? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then from there where does it go? 
A. Thence northwesterly on a direct line 61 
rods more or less to the point of beginning. 
( R. 001390) 
Q. Why do you say those are the same lines? 
Is there something about this particular area 
that helps you fix the location of this 
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boundary? 
A. Well, it calls out the quarter corner, the 
west quarter corner of section 28. This has 
been established and there's also evidence 
that this is the section line. And the fence 
to the south and fence to the north, it lines 
up pretty well, and the bearings close to the 
north and south as well. 
West later explained why he did not use the point in the road but 
rather used a call which was not either in the partition decree nor 
in the historical deed. (R. 002088) 
Q. All right, and 
at a point three rods easterly from the center 
line of said road, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at right angles thereto, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And thence along the easterly side of said 
road. Which you did, didn't you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And three rods easterly from the center 
thereof and at right angles thereto, northerly 
and westerly. Show me where you went 
northerly and westerly? 
A. This is indicating northwesterly going 
west— 
Q. So you went northerly and westerly along 
the road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To this point? 
A. To that point. 
Q. and that says twelve inch CM.P.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that stand for? 
A. corrugated metal pipe. 
Q. So you stayed on the road until that 
point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you stay on the road until that 
point? 
A. This is what I was — what I indicated — 
the section line. But with the section line 
then it went — then it would have been a west 
bearing. This was on the northwest. 
Somewhere I had to make a cutback to the call 
in the deed to west of the quarter corner. 
Q. And it was an arbitrary decision on your 
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part as to where to make the cutback and 
depart from the road, wasn't it? 
A. I talked to Mr. Kinghorn. 
Q. And he told you where to cut off of there? 
A. He said that's where he — yes. 
Q. And that's why you took off from that 
point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how many turns had you made on that 
road? 
A. You made four or five or six turns on that 
road and suddenly decided to depart from the 
road. 
A. I had to, yes. 
Q. Now, is the road a monument? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the three meter — is the three-rod 
distance a metes-and-bounds distance call? 
A. No. It's a part of it, it's — metes and 
bounds say along a certain line. It's not— 
it's just one part of the metes and bounds. 
Q. Three rods is a metes and bounds, part of 
the metes and bounds? 
A. Part of the metes and bounds. 
Q. Aren't you supposed to take the road as 
the monument, stay on the road instead of 
going to the three-rods measurement, the 
three-rods measurement? 
A. In fact it called it out, being three rods 
east of the guarter corner. I have to honor 
that, honor that corner. It's there for a 
purpose. 
Q. Is the general rule of survey that if you 
have a choice you take a monument over a metes 
and bounds call? 
A. The metes and bounds call is for along a 
fence or — 
Q. I'm not asking that. Is the general rule 
that you take a monument over a metes and 
bounds call? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is a road a natural monument? 
A. Yes, it's a natural monument. 
Q. Is a guarter corner an artificial 
monument? 
A. If it's a stone—if it's an original 
corner. 
Q. And is the rule that you take a natural 
monument over an artificial monument? 
A. Yes. 
Q. and if the road is a natural monument, 
sir, and you were on the road why didn't you 
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stay on the road instead of going to a 
measurement from an artificial monument? 
Because Mr. Kinghorn told you do to, isn't it? 
A. No. Still call it out and I would have—I 
looked, searched that area for the original 
corner, could not find it. 
Q. So you reset it? 
A. No, I didn't reset it. Forsgren & Perkins 
set it. They reestablished that corner. 
(R. 002016) 
Q. All right. Sir, this here says the most 
common hierarchy of calls is as follows: one, 
natural monuments; two, artificial monuments; 
three, distances. Do you recognize that as a 
standard treatise in your industry and 
profession that correctly set forth the calls? 
A. Yes, I do. 
(R. 002017) 
Q. All right. Now, Mr. West, this says along 
the easterly side of said road and three rods 
easterly from the center line thereof and at 
right angles thereto. Is that correct? 
A. Urn-Hum. 
Q. You're still on the road at that point, 
aren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Northerly and westerly to a point three 
rods east from the southwest corner of the 
northwest quarter of section 28 aforesaid. 
Now, that's the language you said justifies a 
departure from the road, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. West testified about the decree description not closing as 
follows: (R. 001412) 
A. I thought you were turned around. 
Q. This call here? This call here, it is a 
deed actually east 332.94 feet. What does 
that mean? 
A. The deed, in the deed it calls out 82.5 
fee, and to get over to the road from that 
line boundary, the Boundary line, it takes 300 
feet or better. 
Q. From the court decree? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that actually didn't close, either, did 
it, if you just used the footage? 
A. No. 
Q. That was the one that you in and 
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corrected, gave Mr. Kinghorn a correct 
description and he went in and got the court 
decree changed? 
A. Yes. 
Frank Marcellin testified that the Old Ranch 
Road had moved to the east: (R. 001971) 
Q. Mr. Marcellin, I believe you said that you 
were making these observations in 19— some of 
the observations in 1931. When were you born? 
A. I was born in 1931> I was making the 
observations in #33, '34., on up. 
(R. 001467 — Born in October 1931) 
(R. 001971) 
Q. Okay. So in "33 when you first started 
making the observations you were two year old? 
A. Tow and a half year old, yes. 
Q. Now, you say the road moved. Of course I 
disagree with that, but when do you say the 
road moved? 
A. The road moved when the W.P.A. put that 
in, which would be in about f34 and '35 when 
they got it completed. And they only went to 
the end of where the Macori Property was. 
Q. And you were three-years-old when you saw 
that? 
A. I was four or five before they finished 
it. They didn't finish it in one year. 
Q. It took them two years to finish it? 
A. Longer than that. It was about '35, '36 
when they finish that road. 
Q. Two or three years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the old road that you say went down 
west of where the road is now, when did you 
observe that being used? 
A. I used it when I went there to get the 
milk cows out of the north pasture, as we call 
it. And at that time I was—why I say, I 
started milking cows when I was three and a 
half years old. I went and herded them cattle 
from the field, the pasture to the milk barn. 
Q. On that Old Road? 
A. On that Old Road. And then it continued 
on to the present Old Ranch Road as they 
called it— I call it the Marcellin Lane 
because it's easier—and then on the point Mel 
Flinders was saying it was rocky because it 
was such a bog hole, they then cut back into 
our own property, into our own barn yard. 
Q. Now, as I understand it, you're saying the 
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new road was finished in about 1935. Is that 
correct? 
A. That's the Old Ranch Road. 
Q. The new Old Ranch Road? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. The new old ranch road was finished in "35 
when you were four years old? 
A. No. I was older than that. 
Q. When were you born? 
A. I was born in '31. 
Q. In '35 how old were you? 
A. I was five years old—no. four year old. 
Q. Four years old. Now, when they started 
using the brand new old ranch road, what did 
the old ranch road or the old Marcellin Lane 
look like in terms of a road on the ground? 
A. Okay. That's it was, was wagon tracks 
with sage brush in it. 
Q. It wasn't a six-rod-wide county road? 
A. No, it wasn't 
Q. Do you know why the 1925 deed would say to 
a six-rod-wide county road? 
A. I do not. 
Q. But you're saying, sir, that in 1933, when 
you were two and a half, three, two and a half 
and starting to milk cows, you're certain 
there was no road where the new old ranch road 
now is? 
A. That's when the W.P.A. started putting 
that road over that crest of the hill down 
into the Macori barn. 
Q. And before they started putting that in 
there, there was nothing there? 
A. There was not sagebrush. 
Q. And they started putting that there in 
1934, I believe you testified? 
A. Roughly around in that time, '33, '34. 
Q. So it may have been 1933 when you were two 
years old, is that right 
A. I'm sure that they was working on that 
road prior to that. 
Q. Prior to— 1932? 
A. Urn-Hum. 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. To get the extent of the work that they 
had done they had to be there for quite 
sometime. 
Q. Which you were observing by the time you 
were two years old? 
A. I seen that when I was two. And I seen 
the guys that worked on that W.P.A. crew. 
Q. So by 1932 they had to have been working 
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on the road for quite sometime. What do you 
say is quite sometime? 
A. Possibly within that year, '32 on. 
Q. How about 1931, could they have been 
working on it then? 
A. I don't believe so because my mother and 
dad would have surely told me if they had of. 
Q. But they were working on it in 1932, is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Marcellin testified at R. 001472 to the road change except he 
stated: 
Q. (By Mr. Kinghorn on redirect after a break) 
Let me ask you to restrict your testimony to 
your recollection of the WPA crew, about how 
many years, what years do you recall them 
working on it? 
A. I remember them working there for two or 
three years. 
Q. Can you tell me what those years would be, 
from your testimony? 
A. Roughly maybe '35, '36, '37, that era 
right in there, '38. 
Q. Prior to that time, Mr. Marcellin, do you 
recall what the old ranch road or Marcellin 
Lane looked like? 
A. It was just a wagon road. 
Q. Will you tell me what you mean by "wagon 
road"? How wide was it What did it look 
like? 
A. Well, it would be just enough for wagons 
that had a rim of steel around wooden spokes 
wheels with a bolster between them which, what 
I would say were no more than—at the most, 
they would be maybe eight feet. 
Q. This was a -you're describing the road 
that had basically two tracks that were about 
eight feet wide? 
A. Yes. 
David Moore testified: (R. 001720) 
Q. If I instructed you—if I hired you and 
instructed you to assume in your testimony 
that there would be evidence introduced in the 
trial that this fixed object, the road, had 
been moved by the county to the exact, and 
moved an undetermined distance at some point 
in time after the deeds were written, would it 
change you interpretation of this deed? 
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A. If I saw the evidence was—was able to 
determine what it is, which I haven't seen; 
you're asking me to give a hypothetical. 
Q. That's right, I am. 
A. If the road had changed, which I don't 
know that it has; it would change my opinion, 
yes. 
The foregoing is against the clear weight of the evidence 
is set forth as follows: 
Kent Wilde interprets the same description as follows: 
001765) 
A. Then the deed, as we've gone over this 
numerous times, says that we go on the 
easterly side of a six-rod wide road 
northwesterly up to a point which is three 
rods east of the guarter corner. 
Q. Were those inconsistent calls, in your 
opinion? 
A. Stating it more—you mean along the road 
or until we went to this point? 
Q. Until you where you got to this. 
A. Yes, there was an inconsistency which we 
reached at this point here. 
Q. What was that? 
A. The monument of the road did not coincide 
with the monument of the guarter corner. 
Q. How did you determine that? Did you use a 
metes and bounds call of the three rods to 
determine that there was not a correspondence? 
A. Yes, and by physically finding a monument 
that had been set in '87. 
Q. Did you disregard the three rods? 
A. Where this metes and bounds was 
inconsistent with monument, we used exactly 
the same line of logic to come from the 
easterly side of the road to the guarter 
corner, which showed that it was 
approximately, or with reason, of what that 
distance would have been. 
Q. What was that? 
A. 238 from the easterly side, not the 
guarter, but from the easterly side. 
Q. Was that three chains? 
A. Pretty close. 
Q. And again then to clarify, if you would, 
why you used the east side of the road instead 
of a measurement of the three rods. 
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A, As I read the deed, it states that it's 
tying—whoever prepared the deed, and in 
following the footsteps from the very 
beginning of the deed, he's specifically 
states that it starts on the easterly side of 
a six-rod wide road. He makes the metes and 
bounds to the deed until he comes to a point 
down here, which was the beginning point from 
the Gillmor property to the court proceedings, 
and then he ties it back to the easterly side 
of six-rod wide road, which is three rods east 
of the centerline of the road. Then it says 
it follows that point up to a point to where 
it goes west three rods east of the quarter 
corner. 
Q. Why do you stay on the road at the call 
instead of going to a point three rods east? 
A. Mr. Klnghorn: Objection, leading the 
witness. The witness didn't say that. 
Q. Did you do that? 
The Court: no, no. I'll sustain the 
objection. 
Mr. Summerhays: Withdraw it, your honor. 
When you got to this point—and I would like 
you write "A" on there. Did you use that as a 
boundary marker on the division of the 
property? 
A. I did. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because it called for the easterly side of 
the six-rod wide road. 
Q. Why? did you use that instead of a three-
rod measurement? 
A. I did. 
Q. Why? 
A. Two reasons: One, the original stone that 
was set by the government land office, the 
original indication that anyone has used that 
since it was set in the late 1800's. This 
monument, which was set, which was correctly 
set by Mr. West in 1987 (sic), was a 
proportioning measurement. Now as we review 
all of the plats of the sections, and the way 
they were set, we find that the GLO Plat says 
that particularly section 28 is a short 
section. If we find how it actually sits on 
the ground, we find it's a long section. When 
we establish this corner, it is off of a 
double proportioning method, and that meas it 
affects four measurements. Whatever the stone 
is found to the east, which is the quarter 
corner in this case, a mile to west, a mile to 
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the north, and whatever stone was found to the 
southerly part, this is a calculated 
measurement to fix it in the best position 
that we can. 
Q. When you say "this" can you mark point as 
"B"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is "B"? 
A. It's the southwest corner of section 28. 
Q. Thank you, go ahead. 
A. Doing this proportioning method, and all 
the reference books I've studied and the 
classes I've attended say no way do we ever 
set a proposed monument in exactly the same 
spot as it was set by the original surveyor, 
but it is the best method that we have to 
establish where it should be. 
Q. And what did you do from there? 
A. So in that case, the deed was created in 
1926, the historical deed, or the division of 
the two properties. And so since this 
monument was not set until '87 (sic) this 
physical monument here would have precedence 
over this one, because it was set at a later 
date. 
Q. When you say "this physical monument here" 
what are you referring to? 
A. The easterly side of the six-rod wide 
road. 
Q. Is that what you were referring to as 
taking precedence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that take precedence over? 
A. The monument that was set in '87 (sic). 
(Emphasis Added). 
(R. 001765) 
A. It says approximately five rods. 
Q. How many feet is that? 
A. 82 and one half. 
Q. Was it 82 and one-half feet away from that 
point? 
A. No. 
Q. How far was it? 
A. I measured 307.51 feet. 
Q. How many chains is that? 
A. Approximately five chains. 
0. So it said "five rods," but you went five 
chains? 
A. No, I went to the easterly side of the 
existing road. 
Q. Which turned out to be what? 
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A. Approximately five chains. 
Mr. West admitted that the description didn't close but unlike 
Mr. Wilde he used the distance call rather than the monument which 
violated a primary survey rule. 
Mr. West explains his interpretation as follows: (R. 001618) 
Q. And did you hear Mr. Wilde's—the 
interpretation Mr. Wilde placed on the calls 
and points and distance in the deed in the 
disputed territory? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Do you agree with his interpretation of 
that deed? 
A. Will you explain to the court why you do 
not. 
A. He says that the point where it comes up to 
three rods west of the west quarter corner is 
in the road, he stated in the road. If that 
was the case, it would put a big a bend in 
the section line, would not be straight 
through. 
Q. Do you believe there is a bend in the 
section line to the east? 
A. No. 
David Moore testified: (R. 001681) 
Mr. Summerhays: That's good. I'm going to 
read from Octor v. Maw and see if we can 
stipulate that that's the law of Utah. 
October v. Maw— I have to get my glasses 
here, you honor. This is the Supreme Court of 
Utah, a 1972 case, 493 P.2d 989, citing from 
page 993, a unanimous decision written by 
Justice Callister: 
This court has consistently adhered to the 
principle that a distance call yields to the 
monument call, the reason being that there is 
more likelihood of mistake in courses and 
distances than in calls to fixed objects which 
are capable of being clearly designated and 
accurately described. 
Mr. Kinghorn: Your honor, that's the way our 
Supreme Court—that fine. That's the law. I 
stipulate to it. 
Mr. Summerhays: Is that a rule you use in your 
business? 
A. Yes, the physical monument takes 
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precedence—or, the physical ties in a deed 
take precedence over bearing and distance. 
Q. Are you familiar with the Learned 
Treatise, A Guide To Understanding Land 
Surveys, by Steven Estopenol? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that say about the rule you 
should follow? 
A. It says that there is a hierarchy of 
monuments, the first one being—lost the word-
-a physical monument that is accepted as a 
physical monument. The second one is 
artificial monuments. Physical would be 
things such as to a river, to a road, to 
something that is physical, versus to monument 
that is artificially created by a surveyor. 
Q. To refresh you memory, would it be 
"natural"? 
A. Thank you, natural monuments. 
Q. That's the first hierarchy? 
A. The first rule is you go to the natural 
monument, if it isn't stated in the deed, no 
matter what the bearing and distance are. 
Q. Is a road a natural or artificial 
monument? 
A. Natural. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. They're used for long periods of time. 
Once they're created, they generally don't 
change location without some type of 
condemnation action. 
(R. 1687) 
Q. Now where did Mr. West use as his point? 
A. He used the west quarter corner as his tie 
point and leaves the road. 
Q. Measured three rods? 
A. He leaves the road and measures to a point 
three rods east of the west quarter corner, 
and he adds in a course to ge there. 
Q. That's not in the deed? 
A. It's not referred to at all in the deed. 
Q. Was that correct practice? 
A. No. 
Q. Why? 
A. It's not consistent with the historical 
legal description. The historical legal 
description says, you know, you're going along 
the road; it doesn't say you're leaving the 
road. So this point has got to be on the 
road, wherever it comes up here. 
Q. That's the monuments rule? 
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A. Yes, natural monument is to stay on the 
road. 
Q. What's the next can.' 
Thence west three rods, thence 
northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods more or 
less to the point of beginning. 
Where would that take you? 
A three-rod job here and you go straight. 
Now how wide is the road at this point? 
six- excuse me, six-rods wide. We're on 
the east side of it. 
Q. If you go— if it's six-rods wide, and » ou 
go west three rods, where are you? 
A the center of the road. 
Q. And then you go s t ra icn rt~ of 
beginning? 
A. Yes, in a straight line. 
Q. Is that where the road i s now? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Along here to this point. Here you do a 
jog, and then you qo straight back to the 
point of beginning. 
Q Nov where does Mr. West use as a line? 
A. He's on the road to a point somewhere south 
of the quarter section line and then he 
intersects a line that goes to a point three 
rods east of the west quarter corner. 
Q. Is that a diagonal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is tha I: anywhere i n that description? 
A. No. 
Q. Then where does he go? 
A. He goes to the west three rods, three rods 
to the west quarter corner, and then he goes 
on north, a straight line back to the point of 
beginning. 
(R 001698) 
Q. What's the difference between that legal 
description and the legal description—strike 
that. Are all other legal descriptions in the 
chain of title the same with respect to this 
boundary line other than the partition decree? 
A. Prior to the partition decree, they used 
the same legal description, yes. 
Q. Yes. Now what's the difference between 
those prior to the partition decree and the 
partition decree? 
A. The first difference is that it ties to a 
different section corner, ties to—whoever 
prepared it ties to the southwest corner 
rather than the northwest corner, and it ones 
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are clockwise versus counterclockwise. But it 
makes—you know, the obvious difference is it 
makes no reference at all in the deed to the 
road. 
Q. And that's the document by Gillmor got his 
title? 
A. Yes 
Q. Now if there's no reference in the deed to 
the monument, but only metes and bound 
description, what is the proper way to survey 
it? 
A. Tying to the—you know, using a metes and 
bounds legal description, and ignoring any 
reference to a road, if you're relying totally 
on the partition decree. 
Q. Is that what Mr. West has done here? 
A. In my opinion, yes. 
(Plaintiff's exhibit one also contains an 
amended partition decree that was filed in May 
20, 1993 which does have ties to the physical 
monument the road.) 
Mr. Marcellin testified that the road had moved, which in observed 
when he was 2 or 2 1/2 years and that the work was completed by 
the time he was 4 or 5 years old. The following people who lived 
in the area and travel the road state the road to the best of their 
knowledge is in the same place now as it was in the '20's and 
'30's. 
Jim Sorenson who was born on January 1, 1914 (R. 001837) states: 
(R. 001837) 
Q. And have you been familiar with that area 
since then? 
A. Yes 
Q. And have you had occasion to become 
familiar with old ranch road? 
A. Well, I haven't used it daily, but I used 
it at times daily. I hauled milk on it in 
'34,'35. from the ranchers over there, 
Marcellin's 
Q. And were you about nine years old when you 
moved up there? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And have ;you been familiar with old ranch 
road as it runs north and south since that 
time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you famili ar wi th where it is now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have an occasion about three 
weeks ago to go look, at thi s again wi th Mr 
Cummings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And to your knowledge is the road in the 
same place that it was in when you moved— 
A. Yes 
Q Has it also always been in the same place? 
A Yes, sir. 
(R. 001840) 
Q. Was there ever a time that you remember in 
the '30's when there were W.P.A. crews out 
working on the Old Ranch Road? 
A. Yes. i remember them working there, but 
the exact date I don't know. 
Q. Okay. In '34 and '35 do you recall the 
condition, the size, so forth, of the road, 
what is looked like? Do you remember what it 
looked like? 
A. We.., it's similar to what it is now, the 
sides of the road. Only it was gravel then 
and not paved. 
o. Okay. Was it as wide as it is now? 
A. Well, the place now has been widened out, 
but generally it's the same, yes, 
Q. So you're saying it's about the width now 
as it was in 1934 and '35 
I \ yes. 
The witness: Well, that—-I wouldn't know sir> 
I do know where the road was all my time and I 
know i t's the same as i t is now. 
(R, 001843) 
Q. You don't remember the W.P.A, having made 
any changes in the road? 
A Not in a place that's in question, no. 
Q. Well, I guess I wasn't to make sure you 
understood the last question I asked. What I 
asked you was whether or not you would recall 
today if there had been some changes made by 
the W.P.A. crew on the road north of 
Marcellin's place. Do you think you would 
remember that clearly today? 
47 
A. No, I wouldn't. 
Frank Marcellin disagree with the testimony of the of Jim Sorensen 
(R. 137) and stated that Sorenson never pick up milk there in '34 
and '35 and that Sorenson was no correct that the road never moved. 
Marcellin is testifying that he believed that in '38 the train 
stopped running the milk and after that Al Harris picked up the 
milk. The area of time which Marcellin says in believe something 
happened and the fact that Sorensen clearly stated that it was '34 
and '35 when he picked up the milk because the train had stopped, 
the critical time as to whether Marcellin actually remembers 
whether a road moved when he was 2 1/2 years old and his memory for 
the period of time when he was 3 and 4 and does remember someone 
makes his ability to actually know whether the road moved or 
whether his impressions of his early years on the ranch are clear 
enough to make that firm stand. 
Blaine Bittner testified as follows: (R. 002072) 
A. When I was born on the ranch right there 
in Parley's Park, and we would call it that. 
I was born in 1916. 
Q. You were born in the ranch? 
A. I was 
Q. And you grew up around Old Ranch Road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm referring to Exhibit no. 31, which is 
a section of old ranch road. This is where 
the Garlick home is. 
A. I don't know. I've never heard of the 
Garlick, in fact. 
Q. Are you familiar with the entire Old Ranch 
Road as it runs north and south? 
A. We can go around there infreguently around 
that way. 
Q. To your knowledge, is Old Ranch road the 
same it was as you were growing up? 
A. It's never changed that I know of, except 
when the WPA was there, why, they widened it 
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in a place or two. 
A. They didn't move the road? 
Q. The road was never moved as fa 
(R. 002074) 
Q. Good. The specific area that's in dispute 
here is an area down where this red mark is. 
I'm going to ask you if you remember Emil 
Marcellin. 
/'. Yes, we were friends with Emil. 
ij, do you know Frank, His son? 
f\ I know Frank. 
y do you see the Marce 11 in PJ ace on the 
Aerial Photo? 
A. Well, I assume that that — i t would be 
down in here, wouldn't it? I can't tell from 
the aerial map. I'm not familiar with it. 
Q. Let me represent to you that this group of 
barns and building right here is the Old 
Marcellin Place right here. 
A. This is Ranch Road here, then? 
Q. Yes, this is Ranch Road there. And as the 
road went around, do you recall the condition 
of Old Ranch Road as it went past the 
Marcellin Place and went north up towards you 
place in about the 1930's? 
A. It's never changed I !:  s always been 
there. 
Q It's always been there. Do you remember 
what it looked like in the - - - • the 20's and 
30's? 
The bar :i:i and the house was just below the 
id a ways. 
v. What did the road look Jike? 
A. Just a county road. 
Q. How wide was it? 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q Do you remember a time when it looked like 
a couple of wagon tracks where people— 
A. No, no, it was wider than that mostly. 
Q. in the '30's? 
A. Yes, they started coming with a grader and 
so on. 
Q. do you know when they started doing that? 
A. I don't know; about 1925 I imagine. 
Q. Did you ever remember a WPA work crew 
coming in and working on this section of Old 
Ranch Road? 
A. They worked on it. We gave LIKMII « - in mil 
ground to kind of widen it out. 
Q. Why did you give them ground? 
A. We.., did you give them ground? 
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A. We.., we joined up in here, we joined 
Ranch Road we had a 120-acre meadow in there. 
Q. When they widened it out, did they 
straighten it out a little bit so it ran 
straighter? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Not that you know of. Do you know any 
other work they did down here north of the 
Marcellin Place/ 
A. No, not exactly. 
Q. You don't remember any of the work? 
A. No. But they put them posts in is the 
main thing they did, and that was to furnish 
work for the WPA. 
Q. What Posts? 
Q. Cedar posts. 
Q. What were they marking? 
A. Well, they put them in place of the Old 
ones. 
Q. Fence posts? 
A. Fence posts. 
Q. Did you see them put fence posts in along 
the Marcellin Property? 
A. I think they went clear along there. 
Q. Do you know whether they made any changes 
in the road down here around the Marcellin 
Property? 
A. No, no changes that I know of. 
Q. Would it surprise you if I were to tell 
you that Frank Marcellin recalls watching them 
make changes in the road amount there place? 
A. Yeah. I can't refute him because he lived 
there. 
Frank Marcellin on pages R. 001968 and 001969 stated that he 
disagreed with Mr. Bittner that there were no fences along the road 
and the road never moved. It should be noted that Mr. Bittner 
stated that the road work started around 1925 on Old Ranch Road and 
he would have been nine or ten years old. This was one year prior 
to the original deed to Stephen Gillmor from Charles Spencer. It 
would seem apparent that the drafter of the deed were referring to 
the road that was present and that widen and up grading work on 
began on. Mr. Bittner when asked it would surprise if Frank 
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Marcel"ir m o -••• v . :v w a s ? . -'2 • o -i v;t:c; - s 
ages), m . Diiuier stated Yeah. ^ 
living there so he woiilH ^ot refute him. It should be pointed 
that Mr. Bitter was seventeen when the events were happening as Mr. 
Marcellin described whereas Mi M M M rl 1 in wn> niily .' Il 7 In I CIJI i. 
of age, 
David Loertscher testified: (R, 002042) 
Q. Have you become familiar with the property 
along the Old Ranch Road during your life? 
A. Absolutely, 
Q. What years diiJ '/mi become familial with 
it? 
ft, I went to work there at the? aqe of LH in 
1925. 
0. Where did you work? 
A, 1 worked on what's now known as the 
Buehner property. The barn's stil 1 there. We 
went there to milk cows. 
0 And were you familiar with the Old Ranch 
Road in its entirety and length at the time? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Wi 1 1 you describe what kl nd of road that 
was? 
A. Well, it was just more or less a road 
through the sagebrush for farmers. There were 
three Dairy Farmers there that had to haul 
their milk to the railroad either over in 
Snyderville right up in there or down 
Kimbal1's Junction. 
Q. When d i d you l a s t lunk «it I In- in rid? 
A. This morning. 
Q. And do you recall and have a recollection 
of where that road was in 1925? 
A It is the same place. 
(R. 002049) Mr. Kinghorn: Thank you, your 
honor. I appreciate that. Mr. Loertscher, 
would it surprise you if I were to tell you 
that Frank Marcellin recalls, as a boy, 
watching a WPA crew fix that road over by his 
father's place, take it out of the swamp a 
little bit, move it up on the side of the 
hill, and re-route it up over the side of the 
hill; not very much, but just enough to get it 
out of the swamp? Would that surprise you if 
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I told you that? 
A. I don't recall that, if they did, because 
I didn't go along with them. By that time I 
was up on snow Summit Ranch. 
Q. So you were in another part of the area? 
A. Well, I was up closer to Park City. 
Q. So if they were working down there on 
that, and made a slight change in the road, 
you may not have been aware of it; is that 
fair to say? 
A. If they did, I never noticed it, because 
when we would to Coalville—and in fact later 
on, when I became a county commissioner up 
there—we always travelled that way to go, so 
I never had been aware of any changes in the 
road. 
(R. 002051) 
Q. Mr. Loertscher, that road moved, and I 
think you were referring up on top of the 
road; did you mean the Old Ranch Road moved 
when you said that? 
A. It was still the county road. 
Q. But Old Ranch Road along the Marcellin 
Place, is that what you were referring to? 
A. It's still the same road. 
Of course Mr. Marcellin on page R. 132 stated that he also 
disagreed with the testimony of Mr. Loertscher testified that he 
was 15 in 1925 (R. 002042) when he moved to the area and would have 
been in his early 20s when Mr. Marcellin who was 2 1/2 to 4 years 
of age when he observed the road moving. 
Mr. West has demonstrated that he made some assumptions that 
were not in the deed. If there was ever a monument showing the 
location of the west quarter corner back in 1926, it apparently no 
longer exist. Mr. West therefore set about to locate the corner on 
his own. Using the best and latest of surveying techniques and 
instruments and using the "double proportioning method," he located 
this point considerably west and a little north of where the of 
where the deed description says it ought to be in relation to the 
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road. By his own admission surveying i s currently much mere 
precise, so it should not have come as any great surprise that his 
location of the quarter corner may have differed fr oin where "it was 
thought to have been, over 60 year prior, Mr "West aJ so admits 
001412) that the fir st call to the road further south was 333 feet 
instead of ^h^ p9 ^ -F^ t^ stated i n the deed,. A 1 so by lnG own 
admission, surveying standards require that when there 
i s a disci" 
road), the monument controls, not ; ;,< distance. 
Mr. West now ignores this surveying standard, and the language 
of: I lit deed nis - -
west of the road anc c^ -,; «..•: . newly located quai i ei 
corner. Mr. West advise Kinghorn, l. 002009) 
manufac tur es a - .. . ; 
course and distance west and a Little north from the road, by 
drawing a ] ine fr out. the point east of the road to h is new point. 
t h e 11*'"'w coi.ir a e a,! onc:j "u .i 1.h 1:11tji ,i q n o r i.,iiy i ,i I I h H S U I: v e y i n y s t.a 11da i: d s 
on monument distance, the entire dispute rests. 't is 
important j .• :• v- that there is no such segment in une ueeu. In 
fact tin 1 on] y document i n whi ch th i s course and distance 
ever appears i the new description to plaintiffs' property prepared 
by Mr. West r : * < • * : Granting Motio* to Corree* lerical Error 
in Judgment . . . . ^erald Kinghorn 
and dated May segment, t^ --
 (it. follows: 
"thence soutn il degrees u±<±u u ^ ,,: " 
M. .Jftftt was cal led upon to testify as to whether or not the 
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call, at the disputed point in question, was to the quarter corner 
as he claimed, in the historical deeds, or whether it was along the 
road, his testimony was inconsistent, but he finally admitted that 
there was no support for a new call to the west quarter corner or 
the west boundary line. The record at page 1410 Mr, West testified 
as follows: 
Q. So as far you are concerned, when you got 
to the word "Northerly and Westerly," you had 
to stay on the east side of the road. 
A. It calls out to a point, to a point. 
Q. On the road. 
A. It doesn't say "on the road," it says, "to 
a point 3 rods east from the section corner." 
Q. But aren't you still going Northerly and 
Westerly along the east side of the road 3 
rods east of the center line. 
A. Yes, I am. 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore, there is no evidence to support Mr. West for making 
an extra call to divert down to the west quarter corner which 
created the new boundary segment in the survey of Mr. West. 
The weight of the testimony given during the trial showed that the 
evidence supports that if the clear language of the deed is given 
effect, the entire controversy disappears. The property boundary 
in dispute runs straight down the middle of the existing road, 
which is exactly where Mr. Cummings was told that it went by Emil 
Marcellin, his grantor. 
The Plaintiffs Appellees tried to support Mr. West survey with 
the testimony from Mr. Frank Marcellin that the road had moved, 
which he observed at the age 2 1/2 years of age. The weight of the 
testimony of Mr. Leortcher, Mr. Sorenson, and Mr. Bittner who were 
much older when this supposed road move occurred in 1931 to 1935 
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but they testified that to knowledge the road is still in the same 
place now as it was then. 
The creditability of the survey of Mr. West should have been 
rejected based on the weight of the testimony of Mr. Wilde and Mr. 
Moore and the adherance to the Standard of Surveying practices to 
ignore a distance call when there is a controversy with a monument. 
C. 
ACQUIESCENCE 
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
INTRODUCED TO REFUTE THIS PROOF. 
There is no evidence in the record whatsoever to contradict 
Defendant Appellant Cummings' testimony that he occupied the 
property up to the road since at least 1964, a period of over 20 
years prior to commencement of this action. 
There is also no evidence in the record to contradict the 
following testimony of Defendant Appellant Cummings and numerous 
other witnesses: 
(1) That Mr. Cummings had fenced off the property prior to 
19 64, with the fence running parallel and close to the road. 
(2) That no one had complained about his occupancy of the 
property, the fence he had constructed or his resale of the 
property to others who had occupied it at any time from 1964 until 
the filing of the complaint in this action. 
Under these circumstances, Defendant Appellant Cummings should 
not be required to marshal evidence that in the opinion of 
Defendant Appellant Cummings' counsel does not exist. If any such 
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evidence does exist, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors should point to 
it in their brief. 
Typical of the testimony of seven witnesses provided by 
Defendant Appellant Cummings is the testimony of Alan Pelton. Alan 
Pelton testifies on page 16 lines 6 through line 1 on page 17 of 
the 2:00 p.m. session on February 17, 1994 as follows: 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Is the property which is 
on the west of the Old Ranch Road? 
A. Right 
Q. Now is the Old Ranch Road at that 
location, on the east of the Marcellin 
Property that you purchased, changed its 
location since the year 1961? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At the time you purchased the property, 
was there a fence immediately to the west of 
the property running—immediately west of the 
road running north and south? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you describe the fence for us? 
A. Well, it's a pretty normal barbed-wire 
fence. 
Q. Post and barb wire? 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you know what that fence did at the 
location, what purpose it served? 
A. Well, the Marcellins had a dairy farm 
there, and his cattle grazed inside that 
fence. 
Q. Grazed up to the road on the fence? 
A. Right. 
also on page 18 lines 25 through page 19 line 15: 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Do you remember and 
specific conversations with Mr. Marcellin 
about where the property corner was located? 
A. (Mr. Pelton) Yeah, he—the fenceline of 
his property line is what we understood. 
Q. Right up there. Did you notice the 
fenceline was down off the edge of the hill? 
A. I don't quite understand you. Do you mean 
down off the edge of the hill? 
Q. Did you see up there in the corner of the 
property that the fenceline and the corner 
line were just down off the edge of the hill? 
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A. The fenceline ran right along the west 
side of the road. 
Q. How far up did it go along the road from 
his farm house? 
A. Where it does now. 
Parley M. Neeley testified on (P.46 lines 22 through 24 and page 48 
lines 9 through 18) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Did you observe any 
fence going along the road when you surveyed 
it? 
A. (Mr. Neeley) There was a fence along the 
road, Yes. 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) I'm going to have him do 
that. Mr. Neeley, did you see any other 
fences outside in this field that you were 
surveying that's depicted on 31 in addition to 
the fence that you have drawn there? 
A. No, with the possible exception of fences, 
corral fences where homes are in this area. 
Q. Did the fence extend across what has been 
shown here as the road or right of way? 
A. Yes. 
Blaine Bittner testified: (page 54 lines 19 though to page 55 line 
5) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) You don't remember any of 
that work? 
A. No. But they put them posts in is the 
main thing they did, and that was to furnish 
work for the WPA. 
Q. What posts? 
A. Cedar posts. 
Q. What were they marking? 
A. Well, they put them in place of the old 
ones. 
Q. Fence posts? 
A. Fence posts. 
Q. Did you see them put fence posts in along 
the Marcellin property? 
A. I think they went clear along there. 
Ron Hanney testified: (page 100 lines 6 through page 101 line 1) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) This old fence ran 
considerably west of the road from the point 
right next to the road down to where it was 
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considerably west? 
A. As I remember that, the fenceline runs 
pretty close to the road, but I can remember 
as this amount of snow that was built up in 
that would deep crushing down that fence—. 
Q. The Old Fence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that old fence, it went down and went 
west of the Garlick House? 
A. No, it did not. It stayed up next to the 
road. 
Q. I'm talking about the old fence. 
A. That's what i'm talking about. 
Q. What was the fence you're talking about 
that went west of the Garlick House? 
A. If I said anything about west of the 
Garlick house, it was—that fence, as I said 
right at the very beginning, was right along 
the Old Ranch Road. 
Q. My Question was: did you see another 
fence, and older fence? 
A. No, I did not. 
Mel Flinders testified: (R. 001575 lines 21 through R. 001576 line 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Do you know where that 
fence was with relationship to this stream in 
this disputed area? 
A. (Mr. Flinders) As I stated, yes, sir. 
Q. What's your recollection of the location 
of the fence between the stream and the road 
along that disputed area? 
A. It was as it is now. 
Q. As it is now. Okay. And it's your 
testimony that as far as you know that's a 
livestock fence to maintain and keep in 
livestock? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Veigh Cummings testified about the fence as follows: (R. 001581 
lines 9 through 17.) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Was there a fence along 
the west of that road running north and south? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes. There has also been 
fences on the west side of that road. 
Q. Running north and south? 
A. Yes, north and south. 
Q. How far west of the road were those fences 
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when you were driving the milk route? 
A. Oh, 30 or 40 feet from the center line. 
(R. 001587 lines 8 through 25) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) From that year of 1961, 
when you bought the property, till this 
litigation was filled in 1987, December 1987, 
did the Gillmors or anyone else ever come to 
you and say you don't own that disputed 
property? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) No. No one ever 
questioned my ownership to that property west 
of the Old Ranch Road. 
Q. And prior to your sales to those 
individuals, did you occupy and use the 
property up to the north-south fence on the 
west of Old Ranch Road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that the boundary line that you 
assumed was the east boundary of your 
property? 
A. Yes. I knew it was the east line of our 
property. 
Q. Did anybody ever interrupt your use of 
that property? 
A. No, no. 
(R. 001606 lines 1 through 21) 
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Mr. Cummings, did you ever 
build any new fences on this property in the 
area—I'm just going to restrict my question 
to the area that's shown on exhibit 31 as 
begin the area across the frontage of lot one, 
and I think this is lot nine, the Garlick 
property. 
Did you ever have anybody build any fence 
along there? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) No. repaired fence, but 
no new fences. 
Q. Did you ever have anybody build any new 
fences? 
A. No, not that I know of. 
Q. Specifically, you never had anybody take 
down an old fence that was down around the 
base of the hill there? 
A. No. I don't recall any fences in the 
area, other than fences going west. 
Q. You never had any fences removed? Is that 
correct? 
A. No. I don't recall ever having any fences 
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removed. 
Veigh Cummings also testified as to events concerning the 
watering of sheep which were run on the Gillmor property by Steven 
T. Gillmor, Jr., who's father was the original deed holder of the 
Gillmor property, cousin of Frank Gillmor, Jr., Steven T. Gillmor 
died in 1988, as follows: (R. 001525 lines 1 through R. 001526 
line 6) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) What hill? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) The hill to the east of the 
property that the Gillmor's owned. There was 
their east side of the Old Ranch Road, of this 
blue-green line. 
Q. Right where your hand is? 
A. Up through that area. They owned all that 
ground. In fact, I even helped Steve raise 
tow lower barbed wires and tie them up so his 
sheep could go into the creek and back out as 
an accommodation to him, at no cost. In fact, 
they went down 5200 north and—. 
(Kinghorn) Objection to anything Steve 
Gillmor said 30 years ago as being complete 
hearsay. 
The Court: I would sustain. 
Q. What was, confine your testimony as to 
what was done. 
A. The sheep went into the creek and watered 
on one occasion. They went down 5200 North 
and watered down there and grazed in 5200 
North, which I didn't oppose. I mean we've 
got them out, no problem. 
Q. Would you tell us about what you did about 
the barbed wire fence. 
A. We raised two bottom wires up so they 
would be high enough so the sheep could go 
underneath it and travel to the creek, then 
back up onto the hill and graze. 
Q. You let him do that? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Why did you let him do that? 
A. Because he was my friend. 
Q. Did he ever do that when you—at anytime 
except when you gave him permission? 
A. No, he wouldn't do that. 
Frank Marcellin is the only person to testify that the fence 
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was not along the west side of the road when Cummings purchased the 
property. Frank Marcellin did testify that from 1964 on, there was 
a fence along the road. Frank Marcellin testified as follows: (R. 
001979 afternoon session lines 2 through line 5) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Now, you are clear in 
your mind that a fence was there along the 
west of old ranch road by 1964, directly west? 
A. (Mr. Marcellin) That I know, yes. 
Veigh Cummings also testified: (R. 001875) 
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) All right. and if the 
disputed property—did the disputed property 
lay partly over 5200 north? 
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes. 
Q. And When approximately was 5200 North 
Built? 
A. Sixty-five. 
Q. And to your knowledge was there road 
traffic over that since then? 
A. Ever since, yes. 
Q. Have you ever heard or had any complaint 
about road traffic over that road since then? 
A. no. 
The leading Supreme Court opinion that most recently 
summarizes the history of the law in Utah concerning boundary by 
acquiescence is Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (S.Ct. Utah 
1991). The elements of boundary by acquiescence as stated in 
Chappell are: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences, or buildings, 
(2) Mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, 
(3) For a long period of time, 
(4) By adjoining landowners. 
The testimony at trial was undisputed that since Defendant 
Appellant Cummings purchased the property he or his successors have 
occupied up to the Old Ranch Road for twenty-seven (27) years. The 
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road had always had a fence on the west side of the road congruent 
to the Cummings property. The preponderance of the evidence at the 
trial was always a fence on the west side of the Old Ranch Road. 
Frank Marcellin even testified of the fence being there after 1964, 
except for part of a year when the fence was replaced with a 
different type of fencing (according to Mr. Frank Marcellin). 
Cummings testified that he occupied up to the road which was 
fenced. Defendant Appellant Cummings testified that Stephen T. 
Gillmor, Jr., the son of Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., watered the sheep 
he ran on the property. Cummings also testified that no one from 
the time he purchased the property until the filling of the 
litigation ever disputed his ownership of this property. 
The Utah courts have long recognized boundaries marked by 
fences, walls, buildings, gravel driveways, cement driveways and 
rivers as monuments which establish a boundary line. 1975 Utah Law 
Review: 221; 226. 
There is no dispute that the existing county road and the 
fence on the west line of the road are sufficient visible monuments 
for purposes of boundary by acguiescence. The most credible 
evidence establishes the existing road as the common boundary 
beginning in 1926, the date that the portion east of the existing 
road was deeded to Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., Plaintiffs Appellees 
Gillmors' predecessor, by the Spencers, the common grantors. That 
was 62 years before Gillmors filed suit in October of 1987. Even 
if credence were given to the testimony of Frank Marcellin, that a 
portion of the road was changed somewhere between 1931 and 1935, 
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this shows that the monument in existence for more than 50 years 
before Gillmors filed suit in October 1987. 
Cummings purchased the Marcellin ranch in 1960 taking title in 
1961. At least seven witnesses testified that a fence was along 
the west side of the Old Ranch Road during the period of time when 
Veigh Cummings purchased the Marcellin property. 
Defendant Appellant Cummings testified that he ran cattle on 
the land from the date of his acquisition in 1961 and even 
subdivided part of the land in the disputed area up to the west 
line of the road in 1965. (R. 001505). In 1965, a road was built 
as part of the subdivision, which was an improvement to the west, 
(now called 5200 North) over which a right of way was dedicated 
that included the parcel Gillmors are claiming. Three houses and 
other improvements have been erected by subsequent purchasers from 
Cummings who have been in continuous occupation up to the west line 
of the road to the present. In King v. Fronk, 378 P.2d 893 (S.Ct 
Utah 1963), the placing of a mortgage on the property was 
considered sufficient evidence to raise an inference of occupancy. 
Therefore, subdividing, building a road, granting a right of way 
and selling lots should be considered paramount acts of occupancy. 
Thus, there is clear and irrefutable evidence in the record that 
the land up to the road has been occupied for at least 27 years 
between the time that Cummings purchased the property and the date 
when Gillmor's first claimed an interest in the property by filing 
their complaint in October 1987. There is evidence that there was 
occupancy by the Marcellins prior to 1961. 
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Cummings testified that Stephen Gillmor, Jr., the son of the 
Gillmors' predecessor who ran the Gillmor sheep business on the 
Gillmor property, and the adjoining landowners for the time that 
Cummings and his successors occupied the land, sought permission 
from Cummings to cross under fences, and over the land Gillmors are 
claiming, to water sheep. In Van Dyke v. Chappell, supra asking 
permission to use the land in question was considered evidence of 
acquiescence. 
Mr. Kinghorn said in his closing statement: (R. 002187 lines 
19 through R. 002188 line 10) 
Your honor, I want to turn quickly, while 
we're here, and while I remember it, to this 
point on the mutual acquiescence. Mr. 
Summerhays mentioned that Steve Gillmor had 
come down and made an agreement with Mr. 
Cummings to go through the fence and water his 
sheep. 
Your honor, Exhibit No. 2 contains the 
deeds in the chain of record, and Stephen 
Gillmor, according to his estate documents, 
which are one of the documents in the chain of 
title, Stephen Gillmor died prior to 1934, and 
his estate was probated. The only Stephen 
Gillmor that owned any of this property in 
dispute at any time died prior to 1934, prior 
to the time Mr. Cummings ever came along or 
ever testified about it. 
That physical evidence, that's 
documentary evidence in the record. There's 
no evidence in the record of Stephen Gillmor 
owning one tiny piece of this proeprty from 
1934 forward after Stephen T. Gillmor's estate 
was probated. 
Mr. Kinghorn was mistaken in this position in that Defendant 
Appellant Cummings was clearly referring to Stephen T. Gillmor, 
Jr., who died in 1988, not Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., who died in 
1933. This was confusing to the Court and resulted in material 
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error in the testimony. Stephen T. Gillmor, Jr., was a director of 
Wool Growers and a friend of Veigh Cummings. Stephen T. Gillmor, 
Jr., was in the chain of title as is evidenced in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1. Mr. Kinghorn used this statement to lessen the 
credability of Defendant Appellant Cummings. 
Cummings also testified that no one ever complained about the 
fence, the subdivision, the houses and improvements erected by 
Cummings' successors, or the 5200 North road at any time until 
Gillmors filed suit. The comments of the Supreme Court in Hobson 
v. Panauitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975) are 
instructive regarding failure to raise any objection to 
improvements: 
The very reason for being of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that 
in the interest of preserving the peace and 
good order of society the quietly resting 
bones of the past, which no one seems to have 
been troubled or complained about for a long 
period of years, should not be unearthed for 
the purpose of stirring up controversy, but 
should be left in their repose. 
The other element of boundary by acquiescence is the 
requirement of occupancy for a long period of time. The rule is 
now well established in Utah that twenty years is generally 
considered to be a sufficiently long period of time to establish 
boundary line by acquiescence. Staker v. Ainsworth, 78 P.2d 417 at 
420 (Utah 1990). 
In the Hobson case cited above, the Supreme Court stated at 
530 P.2d 795: 
The question as to just what length of time is 
required has been discussed a number of times. 
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Particularly in the case of King v. Fronk. 
Justice Henriod, speaking for the court, 
pointed out that the statutory period of seven 
years for establishing ownership by adverse 
possession mandates the common law requisites 
of open, notorious, continuos and adverse 
possession, and also requires that the 
property be fenced or enclosed and the taxes 
be paid thereon. But, there are no such 
requisites for establishing boundary by 
acquiescence. It was therein pointed out that 
there is no exact time requirement; and that 
it may depend upon the circumstances of the 
particular case. But the opinion reaffirms 
the view that there must be some substantial 
long period of time and states that it is 
generally related to the common law 
prescriptive period of 20 years; and only 
under unusual circumstances would a lesser 
period be deemed sufficient. [Emphasis added, 
Footnotes deleted]. 
The testimony is unrefuted that Cummings occupied up to the 
road and a fence running parallel to and immediately west of it for 
over twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint. The 
Gillmors and their predessor did not complain to Cummings nor 
assert any ownership interest in the disputed property until 
October 1987. Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. received the title to the 
property in a partician decree in May of 1981. This was his 
inheritance from his father. 
Therefore, it is clear that Defendant Appellant Cummings has 
established title to the property by adverse possession and the 
lower court's ruling to the contrary was clearly erroneous and 
should be reversed with instructions to the lower court that title 
to the disputed property be quieted in Defendant Apellant Cummings. 
This is so clear from the record that costs and attorneys fees 
should be awarded to Defendant Appellant Cummings. 
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D. 
EVIDENCE OF VALUE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Dale Jackman's 
appraissal or his testimony of the value of the land in dispute. 
See case cited under Issue E. 
E. 
OFFSET 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF AMOUNTS PAID 
IN SETTLEMENT BY THE TITLE COMPANY. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN 
OFFSET FOR THESE AMOUNTS. 
The trial Court erred when it declined to admit evidence of 
amounts paid in settlement tp Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors by the 
title company. Utah law does not allow such a result but rather 
requires two things in compensation cases. 
1.) That no party make a double payment. 
2.) Each party pay their appropriate pro rata share of the 
compensation. 
Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(2); 18 Am Jur 2d § 24, 25, 27. 
Therefore the court should either order a new trial on the 
issues or award an offset of $38,000 against the judgment. 
F. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDNAT'S EVIDENCE OF 
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POSSESSION. 
The court erred when it refused to allow testimony during 
the trial that would prove Adverse Possession of the property by 
Cuumings. The record states as follows: (R. 002054) 
If it's in there, I think we ought to read it. 
But by inference—and we omitted to restate it 
here, if we did, that's an oversight, which we 
should not be bound by. But I think we have 
raised it by inference, and their pleadings, I 
think the pleadings raise that issue. They 
say that, "We've occupied the property for a 
long period of time," and so in fairness and 
liberality and in the construction of the 
pleadings, it would certainly allow us to 
raise it at this time. 
And if I'm not through today—how late 
are we going to continue this for? I don't 
know that, but he certainly has a chance to go 
illuminate the issue, and this is the only 
issue before the court on that question, your 
honor. 
And frankly I admit I have a difficult 
burden of proof, but I have the county 
recorder, the county assessor coming in here 
this morning ready to proffer proof regarding 
who has paid the taxes and who has paid the 
taxes might be the hard part. 
Now it looks like that Mr. Gillmor, from 
the evidence I have, and I'm making a proffer 
here, has paid the taxes since 1984 when he 
filed a copy of his boundary line by 
acquiescence. So that—I;m sorry, his 
partition decree, the description in the 
county recorder, and after that was filed in 
'84, the county assessor and the county 
recorder set forth in the description that was 
sent out in the tax notices this disputed 
strip according to the partition decree deed. 
So I have to admit that since '84, Mr. Gillmor 
has also paid taxes. So if I can—. 
The Court: Have both of them paid it? 
Mr. Summerhays: They've both paid it. 
The statute says that My client has to pay all 
the taxes that are paid, so I have to 
establish my case by showing that my client 
was the only one that paid it before 1984. 
(R. 002064) 
The Court: I'm not persuaded by the 
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testimony of Mr. Spriggs that he was—he or 
his deputy were subpoenaed or requested 
specifically to come to the testimony 
concerning adverse possession. I think it 
would be surprise to Mr. Kinghorn in the case, 
and I think it is raised in the issue was 
pointed out in the in the initial pleadings, 
but it is not raised in the answer. This is 
the first—the court remembers having 
discussed this, and I have been at pre-trial, 
and I know at least once we discussed it and 
maybe more than that in this case, but this is 
the first I remember. But of course I could 
easily have forgotten it. I would readily 
admit that. 
But adverse possession was not anything 
that was discussed at the first hearing. I 
know that my decision in the first hearing did 
not have anything to do with adverse 
possession. 
Mr. Summerhays: Of course that was 
because we hadn't put our case on. 
The Court: I understand that, but 
nothing was said concerning that, and I think 
for me to allow you to raise that at this time 
would be prejudicial to the plaintiff's case, 
that the only way I would do that is if the 
case was in such a nature that he had 
sufficient time to rebut anything and I don't 
know where we're going as far as our evidence 
today. 
What I'm saying right now is that I'm 
denying your request. If the case does have 
to go on and on, then I would possibly 
entertain a renewed motion from you as to 
opening it, and we would have to take up 
evidence to rebut it. 
Both the witness list for the August part of the trial and the 
witness list for the February trial both listed Allan Spriggs from 
the recorders office and the February list also list A person from 
the County Assessor office to testify. The question of adverse 
possession was not new to this case. A Summary Judgement in favor 
of the Defendants was reverse and remanded by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on February 22, 1991 on the issue of Adverse Possession. 
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It was remanded to clear up the question of who paid all of the 
taxes. 
This issue was by mean no surprise to the Plaintiff and could 
not have been prejudicial to them if the testimony and the issue 
had been testified to during the trial to not allow it has been 
prejudicial to the Defendant Appellant Veigh Cummings. 
6. 
SLANDER OF TITLE ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF SLANDER OF TITLE ON ITS 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO 
REFUTE THIS PROOF. 
The elements of Slander of Title are set forth in First 
Security bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 
1989) as follow: 
Next to be determined is whether Appellees 
slandered Banberry's title. To prove slander 
of title, a claimant must prove that (1) 
there was a publication of a slanderous 
statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) 
the statement was false, (3) the statement 
was made with malice, and (4) the statement 
caused actual or special damages, citing Bass 
v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 
566, 568 (Utah 1988), and cases cited therein. 
The Banberry Court, Justice Hall, speaking for a unanimous 
court, went on to say: 
"A slanderous statement is one that is 
derogatory or injurious to the legal validity 
of an owner's title or to his or her right to 
sell or hypothecate the property..." 
The record of the court shows unrefuted evidence of all of the 
elements of Slander of Title and each element will be marshalled 
and the weight of the evidence shown to prove each point. 
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First element there was a publication of a slanderous 
statement disparaging claimants title.. Mr. West testified that 
the first survey did not call to a road. (R. 001426) 
Q. And when you were looking at the deed from 
Spencers to Gillmore, and it says at a point 
three rods easterly from the centerline of 
said road and at right angles thereto, along 
the easterly side of said road three rods 
easterly from the centerline thereof and at 
right angles thereto, northerly and easterly 
to a point three rods east from the southwest 
corner; and that's the quarter corner, isn't 
it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what led you to made a diagonal 
straight over to that point? 
A. That's the first survey I did. I didn't 
call out a road, and I put that diagonal 
through there. 
Q. You concluded there, the first time you 
drew that, you concluded that you would leave 
the road from the beginning point and go 
straight to that point? 
A. I assumed it could have been a road there 
or 82.5 feet west. 
Q. So you went-you departed from the road at 
this point and west straight to that line east 
of the quarter corner? 
A. It didn't tell on the—say a road, it 
didn't say anything. 
Q. Yes, even though is said northerly and 
easterly along the orad, you just drew a 
diagonal. 
A. That's the first survey. 
Q. Yes, that was a logical conclusion to 
make, you should draw a straight line and 
depart from the road; then you concluded that 
you would do it differently and you decided 
that you would follow the road and depart from 
the road at a different point. Isn't you 
departure from the road at the second time you 
surveyed it just as invalid as you departure 
from the roadway back here the first time you 
surveyed it? 
A. (no audible response) 
Mr. West also testified (R. 001633) also stated that the first 
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survey, which was recorded, that when there was no call to the road 
in the original partition decree did cut across part of Cummings 
lots. This therefore would constitute a publication that was 
false. 
The second element is where the statement was false. West own 
testimony at R. 001633 and R. 1426 that this was there was two 
surveys and the first survey description did not have a description 
to the road causing a straight call which then cut over property 
belonging to the Cummings which was evidence by a lis pendens being 
filed. 
The third element is malice, the careless act of filing a 
survey with an incorrect description no parcelling with the 
original historical deeds or without checking the history deeds 
demonstrates malice. 
The four element is actual damages. Curtis Oberhansley 
testified in the Records from 002103 through 002113 of the loss of 
a sale to the Cummings for property that he was intending to 
purchase but for the lis pendens and the incorrect description 
which cause the lis pendens. 
All of the above showed that the property owned by Veigh 
Cummings was slander by the acts of the Plaintiffs. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should therefore reverse the decision of 
the Third District Court, Quiet Title to the disputed strip to 
Defendant Appellant Cummings, award him his costs and attorney 
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fees, and direct the lower court to enter a judgement accordingly, 
DATED this 10th day of November, 1994. 
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